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Since the 1990s economists have devoted considerable attention to the study of the 
relationship between financial markets development and economic growth. In 
particular, the emergence of stock markets with economic development is an intriguing 
and interesting aspect of such a relationship, and yet relatively unexplored. This paper 
examines the most recent findings in the theoretical and empirical literature trying to 
determine the rationale behind the development of stock markets along the path of 
growth and the nature of the interrelationship between real and financial variables. 
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1 Introduction 
In the wake of substantial empirical evidence, recent decades have seen economists 
devoting considerable attention to the study of the interrelationship between financial 
variables and the processes of real resource allocation. These studies have directed their 
efforts towards challenging the idea of an existing dichotomy between the real and 
financial worlds, which has long been assumed by a large part of the literature and 
which has found strong theoretical support in the Modigliani and Miller theorem. 
 
Indeed, the real world seems to depict a quite different state of affairs. As the data show, 
the structure of financial markets, far from being stable and static, moves along with 
economic growth and capital accumulation in many economies. Furthermore, the co-
movements of financial markets and economic systems appear to display significant 
regularities. At low stages of economic development, when economies are relatively 
poor, financial systems are very rudimentary: financial intermediation is scarce and 
financial instruments are very simple and basic. At these stages stock markets are 
completely absent. As economies develop, financial intermediation grows, more 
complex and articulated financial instruments appear in the market, and stock markets 
emerge. These represent very general regularities and describe in broad terms the 
development of financial markets and the interrelationship of financial development and 
capital accumulation. However, the data also provide other more specific features of the 
co-movements between financial and real variables. These features might differ from 
county to country and from period to period, but they still say a lot about the relevance 
of financial variables in the process of real resource allocation. 
 
Until now, the literature has mainly focused on the role of financial intermediation in 
the process of economic growth and capital accumulation. Indeed, many studies have 
analyzed the channels through which banks and other financial intermediaries may help 
to increase, for example, the saving rate or the average productivity of capital and, in 
turn, growth. Recently, however, a new wave of interest on a specific aspect of financial 
market development has occupied economists’ investigative activity. This is the role 
played by stock market development in the process of economic development.  
 
The renewed interest, which is predominantly theoretical, stems from the fact that 
despite the large body of empirical evidence, many questions remain unanswered. Why 
do stock markets develop relatively late in the process of economic development? Why 
do firms change corporate financing decisions, preferring debt over equity in richer 
countries? Is it economic development that engineers transformations in financial 
systems and determines the emergence of stock markets, or, rather, is it stock market 
development that spurs economic growth? These, together with other questions, have 
been extensively analyzed by a large number of recent theoretical and empirical studies.  
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Significantly, the evolution of financial markets does not appear to be a straightforward 
and linear phenomenon. A complex bundle of connections between the relevant 
variables makes it difficult to uncover, and replicate through modelling, the real 
dynamics of the economic systems. Among these empirical facts, one surfaces as a 
particularly interesting one. The emergence and expansion of stock markets does not 
usually give rise to the simple substitution of financial intermediation with equity 
financing in the economy. Rather, the expansion of stock markets always appears to be 
followed by an initial expansion of debt and bank financing, to such an extent that the 
equity/debt ratio in the economy first decreases and only increases with further 
economic development. Figure 1 provides a description of the evolution of financial 
markets in a sample of countries including advanced OECD economies and some major 
emerging markets.  
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Domestic credit provided by
banking sector (% of GDP)  
Market capitalization of listed
companies (% of GDP)    
  
Source: World Bank Economic Indicators 2004. 
Note: The data are annual averages of the values in the following sample countries: Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, 
United Status, Rep. Korea, China, Malaysia, India, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, 
Russian Federation. 
 
Although the objective of previous studies has been generally the same, the 
methodological approach has not. In fact, in order to explain the emergence and 
evolution of stock markets, and to take account of the impact of such modifications in 
financial markets on economic development, the literature has followed different routes. 
Despite the differences, these studies can be clustered into two major groups. The first 
group deals with the emergence of stock markets as a pure macroeconomic 
phenomenon. For these studies the modifications in financial systems are the result of 
changing costs associated with different financial institutions. The second group is more 
interested in analysing the corporate financing decisions of individual firms. These 
studies try to verify how firms’ financing choices change with capital accumulation. We 
will refer to the approach followed by the first group as the ‘institutional approach’ and 
to the second as the ‘instrumental approach’. 
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Our main objective is to critically examine the current state of the theoretical literature 
which, although substantial, has left space for further investigation. The aim is to 
organize and manage the main results of these studies in order to shed light on the issue 
of stock market development and economic growth and to open new avenues for a 
different approach to the empirical evidence. And it is from the empirical evidence that 
it is necessary to start in order to understand the evolution of the theoretical literature. 
2 Empirical  evidence 
A large body of empirical studies clearly shows that the development of stock markets 
is strongly and positively correlated with the level of economic development and capital 
accumulation. This is a solid and uncontroversial result, and it appears to be true across 
time and for many countries. Indeed, the data confirm that as economies develop equity 
markets tend to expand both in terms of the number of listed companies and in terms of 
market capitalization (Atje and Jovanovich 1993; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1996a, 
1996b; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1996; Korajczyk 1996; Levine and Zervos 
1996, 1998). This result, however, does not suggest a direct and monotonic expansion 
of the share of equity markets in the financial system. In reality, the expansion of equity 
markets always appears to be preceded and accompanied by the general expansion of 
the overall financial system. And to a careful observer, far from being a simple and 
straightforward fact, the co-evolution of real and financial variables is a complex and 
multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, the expansion of stock markets generally follows the 
development of commercial banks and other financial intermediaries which, in many 
cases, continues as equity markets expand. This process produces an apparently 
puzzling situation: an expanding equity market together with a financial system 
persistently dominated by banks and their financial products. Even if the evidence often 
appears to be bewildering, and in many circumstances difficult to interpret, some simple 
general stylized facts about the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth can be drawn from the empirical literature (De Gregorio and Guidotti 
1995; King and Levine 1993a, 1993b; Levine and Renelt 1992; Roubini and Sala-i-
Martin 1991). These facts are summarized in the following points: 
—  In the early stages of economic development, financial markets are very thin 
and very rudimentary. During these stages, financial markets are dominated by 
banks, or similar types of financial intermediaries. Stock markets are 
completely absent or, if they exist in any form, their size is negligible. 
—  As capital accumulates financial intermediaries develop, the number of 
financial instruments increases, as does the level of sophistication and 
complexity of financial contracts and the flow of resources and funds accruing 
to the financial market increases its size. Stock markets start developing both 
in terms of the number of listed firms and market capitalization. 
—  As the economy continues to grow, equity markets develop further and so do 
banks and other financial intermediaries.    4
—  Stock markets appear to develop in a non-monotonic ways. In economies 
where stock markets are relatively small, capital accumulation seems to be 
followed by a relative increase in banks’ share in the financial system. In 
economies where the stock market has already reached a reasonable size, 
further development of the market causes an increase in the equity markets’ 
share. In other words, evidence shows that the equity/debt ratio first decreases 
and, only with further development of the stock market, increases. 
The co-evolution of equity markets and capital accumulation is only one aspect of the 
more general interrelationship between economic growth and the expansion of the 
financial system. Since the seminal contributions by Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon 
(1973), economists have devoted considerable attention to the study of the role played 
by financial intermediation in the process of real resource allocation and capital 
accumulation. Only very recently have economists specifically focused their attention 
on the role of stock markets in the process of economic development. Interestingly, 
these recent studies have not only revealed novel theoretical and empirical aspects of the 
channels of interaction between real and financial variables, they have also been able to 
shed light on individual firms’ optimal financial choice in connection with economic 
development.  
 
Before turning to a synthetic description of these studies, it is necessary to agree, at the 
onset, on a definition of equity markets’ development, and to specify a measure of such 
development. In doing so, it is useful to observe that the development of a stock market 
can be identified by means of quantitative or qualitative measurements or by a 
combination of the two. Different routes can be pursued. The primary route to follow in 
order to assess the expansion of a stock market is to look at changes in its dimension. A 
simple measure of a stock market’s size is the total value of all the shares in the market 
at each point in time (market capitalization) or the average of this value over a period. 
Market size is important because the level of savings mobilization and risk 
diversification depend strongly on this indicator. Of course, a measure of a stock 
market’s size needs to take into account the dimension of the economic system overall. 
For this reason, the typical measurement employed in empirical analyses is the ratio of 
market capitalization to gross domestic product (GDP) (market capitalization/GDP). 
Stock market size can also be measured by the number of listed companies in the stock 
exchange in each period. Although market size is an important indicator of stock market 
development, this measurement by itself does not capture all the relevant features of a 
financial markets’ development. Indeed, a developed market is also an efficient and 
liquid market in which financial funds can be mobilized at low cost and can move easily 
from one investment to the other. These qualitative features of market development can 
be captured by indicators such as the volume of shares traded in each period and the 
degree of concentration. While the former of these indices measures the level of 
liquidity in the market, the latter takes into account the level of risk diversification. 
Finally, in order to capture the main features of financial market development, one 
cannot fail to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework which   5
represents the basic organization of the market. It is useful to provide a brief and 
schematic description of such indicators: 
—  Market capitalization ratio: this is calculated by dividing the value of listed 
companies (market capitalization) by GDP. It gives a measure of the size of the 
stock market relative to the size of the economy. It is a good measure of the 
relative size of the stock market in the economy. 
—  Number of listed companies: this specifies the number of all companies listed 
in the country’s stock exchange at any point in time. This indicator is also a 
measure of stock market size.  
—  Total value traded: this gives the total value of shares traded during the 
period. Total value traded divided by GDP gives a measure of the liquidity in 
the market. Market liquidity measures how easily securities can be bought and 
sold. This indicator complements the market capitalization ratio and signals 
whether market size is matched by trading activity. 
—  Turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded during the period divided by 
the average market capitalization for the period. Average market capitalization 
is calculated as the average of the end-of-period values for the current period 
and the previous period.  
—  Institutional and regulatory framework: the degree of development of a 
market is strongly influenced by the regulatory system. Differences in 
regulatory systems, for example, are often used to explain the great differences 
in equity market development between countries such as the UK, the USA, and 
Canada on one side and Japan, Germany, France, and Italy on the other, 
despite their similar level of economic development.  
—  Concentration: the degree of market concentration is important to show how 
well a market really works. A very high degree of concentration signals a 
heavy and illiquid market. In such circumstances, the benefits of risk 
diversification in markets are very low. A measure of concentration could be 
provided, for example, by the average size of firms listed in the stock market 
(see Figure 2).  
Tables 1a and 1b describe some of these indicators of stock market development for two 
groups of countries: a sample of advanced OECD countries and some major emerging 
economies. Significantly, for almost all of these countries, the market capitalization 
ratio and the number of listed firms show that the size of stock markets has increased 
over time. Furthermore, as witnessed by the total stock traded over GDP indicator, stock 
markets have been increasingly active, showing an increase in the level of liquidity in 
recent decades. Through these and other indicators, empirical studies have provided 
hard evidence of the co-evolution of stock market development and economic growth 
and highlighted the most relevant features of this interrelationship.  
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Source: World Bank Economic Indicators 2004. 
Note: The average firm size in the reference period is calculated on the basis of the average market 
capitalization and the average number of listed firms over the same period.  
 
Table 1a: Stock market development indicators: sample of advanced OECD countries  
 
Market capitalization of 
listed companies 
(% of GDP) 
Number of listed 
domestic companies 
Total value of stocks 
traded (% of GDP) 
  1988-92 1993-97 1998-02 1988-92 1993-97 1998-02 1998-02 1993-97 1998-02 
Australia 44.99 68.59 96.90 1143 1157 1280 14.13 30.50 57.36
Belgium 36.40 42.05 75.34 181 149 163 4.03 7.59 18.84
Canada 46.52 69.89 102.66 1128 1226 1862 14.07 35.42 64.34
France 28.51 37.75 87.51 646 550 810 9.12 21.27 64.99
Germany 21.48 27.38 55.85 549 580 880 29.55 23.69 54.02
Greece 11.60 18.04 91.98 128 205 307 2.06 7.44 66.16
Ireland   49.32 71.54  80 74 16.15 33.20
Italy 14.63 20.17 53.88 220 233 277 3.31 10.27 50.76
Japan 105.39 66.39 67.68 2056 2269 2595 55.78 24.78 41.02
Norway 18.99 32.28 37.31 118 151 193 9.46 16.64 31.03
Portugal 13.49 21.62 49.63 181 171 106 3.02 8.29 34.07
Spain 24.39 36.00 76.17 410 372 1333 7.80 30.74 143.43
United Kingdom  91.74 131.27 164.21 1853 2024 1912 40.39 48.90 121.74
United States  62.70 98.07 146.77 6689 7988 7133 34.31 77.43 242.59
Source: World Bank Economic Indicators 2004. 

























Table 1b: Stock market development indicators: sample of major emerging countries 
 
Market capitalization of 
listed companies 
(% of GDP) 
Number of listed domestic 
companies 
Total value of stocks traded, 
(% of GDP) 
  1988-92 1993-97 1998-02 1988-92 1993-97 1998-02 1998-02 1993-97 1998-02 
Korea, Rep.  43.62 32.30 55.90 667 730 1228 37.71 48.07 162.31
China 2.46 12.06 38.54 33 416 1056 2.11 21.53 39.88
Malaysia 111.42 248.99 143.10 292 549 791 21.66 162.22 44.06
India 14.83 34.87 29.56 3204 4983 5821 6.85 17.24 50.06
Argentina 5.46 16.85 55.11 178 154 116 2.59 5.92 2.60
Brazil 9.00 27.57 33.00 579 545 458 3.76 16.79 15.08
Mexico 19.92 36.76 22.37 202 194 179 6.58 14.65 6.84
South Africa  123.16 161.71 148.44 721 639 584 6.54 16.35 59.30
Turkey 7.39 19.74 32.93 98 204 295 3.12 22.00 52.12
Russian Federation 0.05 9.03 23.96 20 115 225  1.24 6.19
Source: World Bank Economic Indicators 2004. 
Note: The data are the author’s calculation of averages over five year periods. 
 
By studying a relatively large set of 40 countries in the period 1979-88, and focusing on 
the dynamics of market size, Atje and Jovanovich (1993) have found a strong positive 
correlation between the level of financial development and stock market development 
and economic growth. In a more recent study, Levine and Zervos (1998) obtain similar 
results on a larger set of observations. They sample 47 countries from 1976 to 1993, and 
find that stock market liquidity measured as the value of stock traded relative to the size 
of the market and the size of the economy is strongly and positively correlated to the 
rate of economic growth. They also observe that the level of banking development, 
measured as the ratio of bank loans to the private sector to GDP, is positively correlated 
with the level of economic growth. The significance of stock market development in the 
process of economic growth is also confirmed by Beck and Levine (2001) who, by 
applying novel econometric procedures, test for the independent impact of banks and 
stock markets on growth. Again, Beck and Levine find that the expansion of both banks 
and stock markets significantly affects growth. 
 
As already outlined, beyond this apparently clear and general result, the dynamic 
interaction between financial and real variables is an articulated and multifaceted 
phenomenon which can differ greatly from country to country. In order to get an idea of 
these differences in the evolution of the financial systems, it is useful to mention the 
contraposition between the so-called bank-based financial system predominant in 
continental Europe and Japan, and the so-called market-based system predominant in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries. In the former countries, in which the banking sector 
strongly dominates the financial sector, economic growth and capital accumulation have   8
involved a significantly less perceptible development of equity markets despite these 
countries displaying similar levels of capital accumulation to Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
Although the dynamic patterns of financial systems can differ greatly from country to 
country, some general stylized facts about the development of equity markets can be 
drawn from the literature. As outlined by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), 
stock markets do not develop in a monotonic way, neither, as one might wrongly 
deduce, does the development of equity markets directly crowd out the banking sector 
and other financial intermediaries. Rather, the dynamics of equity markets seem to 
depend on the level of economic development and on the level of the stock market 
development itself. In specific terms, when economies have thin and underdeveloped 
stock markets, capital accumulation leads to an increase in the share in the economy of 
debt and bank financing. As economies grow and stock markets develop more, further 
development of stock markets leads to a relative increase of equity financing in the 
economy. In other words, given that stock market development depends on growth, the 
bank debt/equity ratio in the economy tends to increase at low levels of capital 
accumulation and to decrease only when stock markets have reached a reasonable size.  
 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic provide an explanation for this finding based on the 
effect of equity market development on the cost of access to credit. The idea is that in 
the initial stages of economic development, the expansion of stock markets increases 
both the opportunity for risk sharing and the flow of information in the market. These, 
in turn, allow firms to access bank loans more easily and cheaply and to increase the 
level of leverage. However, as stock markets develop further, issuing equity becomes 
more convenient because of the falling costs of going public, and firms substitute equity 
for debt. In line with these ideas, Pagano (1993) shows more formally that because of 
trading externalities in the market and the strategic behaviour of listing companies, the 
size of the stock market is crucial in explaining its own development. Indeed, a firm that 
goes public increases the risk sharing opportunities for investors through portfolio 
diversification.  
 
The idea is simple. Assume a situation where borrowing constraints and lack of liquidity 
force entrepreneurs to go public. The price they get from floatation depends on the 
behaviour of other entrepreneurs and on the size of stock market. Indeed, if few 
entrepreneurs decide to list their companies, the gains from portfolio diversification are 
low and few investors will demand shares in the market. As a consequence, the share 
price will be kept low, and so will the return on floatation. Therefore, the return on 
floatation for each entrepreneur strategically depends on what all other entrepreneurs 
do. If many entrepreneurs decide to go public, the return on flotation will be higher and 
equity issue will be relatively more convenient. A thicker equity market makes equity 
issue less costly. Extending this idea into a dynamic framework, one could infer that 
strategic complementarities in the stock market could well explain the non-monotonic 
behaviour of the debt/equity ratio along the path of capital accumulation.   9
Volatility of stock prices is another empirical aspect of stock market development which 
has received considerable attention in the literature. By itself, volatility of stock returns 
is not an indicator of stock market development. However, high levels of volatility, by 
affecting average portfolio risk, can significantly affect the return on investment and 
growth. There are a variety of channels through which high volatility can have a 
negative impact on investment and growth: 
—  It may cause great instability of the financial system as a whole. 
—  It can decrease the supply of financial funds, and raise the cost of access to 
capital by discouraging savings from risk averse individuals. 
—  To the extent that equity markets help to channel resources towards the most 
profitable investment through price signalling, highly volatile stock prices 
cause misallocation of resources because prices do not correctly indicate return 
on investments.  
These arguments would suggest that high volatility should negatively affect growth and 
capital accumulation. Along this line of reasoning, Singh (1997) sustains that because of 
high volatility, the large expansion of stock markets in developing countries, far from 
helping industrialization and fostering capital accumulation, can hamper economic 
growth. Indeed, according to Singh, the expansion of stock markets in developing 
countries since the beginning of the 1980s has not been caused by the endogenous 
evolution of financial systems, as described above, but by means of ad hoc 
governmental programmes of privatization and financial liberalization. This financial 
‘de-repression’, as denoted by Singh, however, has occurred without a change in the 
regulatory system or infrastructure, which remain inadequate to support well 
functioning equity markets. The result is very volatile stock markets that are unable to 
carry out the roles they play in advanced economies such as monitoring, screening, and 
information gathering—which is how they enhance growth.  
 
Although the arguments on the potential negative impact of volatility on growth appear 
to be very convincing, Levine and Zervos (1998) do not find any significant relationship 
between volatility and growth in the sample countries over the period considered. They 
measure volatility as a 12-month rolling standard deviation estimate on stock returns 
and regress this estimate on the rate of growth and obtain no significant results. 
 
Open economies with deeply integrated financial markets can benefit from cross-border 
capital flows and from larger flows of financial resources pouring into the market. As 
theory suggests, international financial integration, by bringing about a greater degree of 
portfolio and risk diversification, may boost the propensity to save and invest and, 
through this channel, can foster growth (Obstfeld 1994; Devereaux and Smith 1994). In 
other words, internationally integrated financial markets can potentially be associated 
with higher rates of growth and capital accumulation. There is no doubt that financial 
globalization can benefit stock markets more than other financial institutions because 
the former can mobilize financial resources at low cost. One can therefore argue that   10
although financial globalization is not a direct indicator of stock market development, 
the international integration of financial markets would increasingly be expected to be 
accompanied by expanding stock markets and higher rates of economic growth. 
Following these theoretical suppositions, Korajczyk (1996) investigates whether 
internationally integrated stock markets are positively correlated with capital 
accumulation and economic growth. In order to measure international market 
integration Korajczyk adopts an International Arbitrage Pricing Model for 24 national 
markets. This gives a benchmark equilibrium model which gives stock returns in 
hypothetical fully integrated markets. Deviation of effective stock returns from these 
benchmark values gives a measure of the distance of these economies from full 
integration. In line with the theory, Korajczyk finds that market segmentation is higher 
for developing than for developed countries. Moreover, market integration tends to 
increase as capital accumulates, showing a positive correlation between stock market 
integration and economic growth. 
3 Theoretical  issues 
Despite this overwhelming empirical evidence, a number of questions remain 
unanswered. Why do stock markets develop later than other financial institutions in the 
process of capital accumulation? How can the apparent complementarity between the 
equity market and the banking sector be explained? Why do some countries have 
overdeveloped stock markets while others have very thin stock markets 
(notwithstanding their level of economic development)? Finally, is it the development 
of stock markets that spurs economic growth, or is it the process of capital accumulation 
and growth that transforms the financial system and causes the development of stock 
markets? These are among the questions that a growing body of theoretical studies has 
recently tried to answer. It is clear that in order to address these issues, it is first 
necessary to understand the exact role of the stock market in the process of real resource 
allocation and how the financing decisions of firms affect investments. Second, it is 
necessary to determine the possible channels of interaction between real and financial 
variables.  
 
The literature on this issue can be categorized as having followed two main routes: the 
institutional approach and the instrumental approach. The institutional approach focuses 
on the macroeconomic role of stock markets. By identifying and understanding the 
working of stock markets, and the main differences between the functioning of financial 
intermediaries, it is possible to understand why equity markets emerge at the advanced 
stage of economic development and the correlation of stock market development with 
the evolution of the banking system. The instrumental approach focuses, instead, on the 
microeconomic aspect of the optimal financial choice of the firm. It typically studies the 
differences between equity financing and debt financing and how corporate finance 
affects the investment decisions of firms. The objective of these studies is to understand 
why, depending on the level of capital accumulation in the economy, firms change their   11
preferred source of external funds and switch from debt financing to equity issue. These 
analyses, in turn, also need to explain the reverse causal relationship and to establish 
how the above changes in the financial system affect the process of economic growth. 
3.1 Institutional  approach 
Modern financial systems pivot on two main financial institutions: one is commercial 
banks, the other is stock markets. Although these institutions have the same ultimate 
aim, which is conveying financial funds from lenders to final borrowers, they do so 
through very different channels, and play very different roles. Understanding these 
different roles can help us to shed light on the mechanisms through which financial 
variables can influence resource allocation and, in turn, economic growth. Indeed, as the 
theory has exhaustively established, the functioning of financial markets can determine 
the flow of resources channelled to investment as well as the optimal choice of the type 
of investments and projects to be financed.  
 
In order to understand the process through which financial intermediation emerges and 
changes along the path of capital accumulation and, most importantly for our purposes, 
in order to understand why as capital accumulates, banks and financial intermediation 
are substituted with stock markets, it is necessary to focus on the specific functioning of 
these institutions and to look for the main differences which might influence the process 
of economic growth.   
 
For a long time the literature has thoroughly studied the functional activities of financial 
intermediaries. Despite this, only recently have economists focused specifically on the 
role of financial intermediation in the process of economic development.
1 The results of 
these studies are quite clear. Banks and other financial intermediaries can influence the 
process of resource allocation and investments through the following channels:  
—  Financial intermediaries free resources in the economy by reducing transaction 
costs through the economies of scale involved in their activity. Moreover, they 
supply specific services, such as brokerage, which reduce frictions and let 
financial flows move more easily and at lower cost through the system. 
—  Banks and financial intermediaries bring about significant improvements in 
risk diversification by supplying a wide array of financial assets with very 
specific features. This should increase the propensity of risk averse agents to 
save and invest.  
—  One of the main functions of financial intermediaries is the maturity 
transformation of financial assets. The consequent increase in the array of 
                                                 
1 Battacharia and Thakor (1993) develop a broad survey on the most relevant studies on financial 
intermediation. Levine (1997) presents a large survey on the latest literature on financial intermediation 
and economic growth.   12
financial assets stimulates the supply of financial funds and of savings and 
investments. 
—  Banks collect and produce a large amount of information. This reduces the 
intensity of information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers and 
improves the allocation of resources. 
—  Banks facilitate long-term relationships and commitments. Long-term 
relationships are very important, particularly when firms have no established 
long-term track records and reputation problems are, therefore, severe. Under 
these circumstances, long-term relationships may decrease the amount of credit 
rationing which otherwise would be very high given the reputation problems. 
While progress in the literature on financial intermediation and economic growth has 
been quite substantial, the literature on the specific role of stock markets in the process 
of economic development is still quite thin and many aspects of this matter remain to be 
explored. Despite this, a number of interesting features of the interrelationship between 
equity market development and growth have been already disclosed. Stock markets can 
support resource allocation and spur growth through very different channels. Below we 
try to summarize the results: 
—  Reduction in transaction costs and liquidity costs. By reducing transaction 
costs and liquidity costs, stock markets can positively affect the average 
productivity of capital (Levine 1991; Bencivenga et al. 1996). 
—  Resource pooling and saving mobilization. By pooling resources on larger 
projects which would otherwise have difficulty accessing finance, stock 
markets can mobilize savings and spur the rate of investment (Greenwood and 
Smith 1997). 
—  Acquisition of information about firms. By promoting the acquisition of 
information about firms, stock markets may promote and improve resource 
allocation and the average productivity of capital (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; 
Kyle 1984; Allen 1993; Holmstrom and Tirole 1993).  
—  Corporate control. By exerting a continuous and strict control over the 
management of firms, stock markets positively affect firms’ investment 
decisions and the average return on investments (Diamond and Verrecchia 
1982; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Laffont and Tirole 1988; Scharfstein 1988). 
—  Risk diversification. By improving risk diversification through internationally 
integrated stock markets and increasing the array of possible investments, 
stock markets can augment the rate of saving and the rate of investment (Saint-
Paul 1992; Devereux and Smith 1994; Obstfeld 1994).   
The duration of investment projects—in conjunction with the expected rate of return 
and the relevant risk—is a very important variable for investors. Investors, who strictly 
prefer shorter-term assets, might find investments with particularly long maturities 
unattractive. Moreover, disrupting an investment project before it has reached maturity   13
can be very costly in terms of missed profit and lower rates of return. Following this 
line of arguments, Levine (1991) builds a theoretical model which shows that by 
reducing these liquidation costs, and increasing the average productivity of capital and 
the rate of savings, stock markets can foster capital accumulation and growth. In fact, by 
their nature equity markets make it possible to transfer the ownership of investment 
projects that are already running before their final realization and without disrupting 
physical production. This feature of stock markets has two effects: (a) it attracts more 
resources into long-term investments from investors who would not have committed 
their finances for long periods of time; (b) it reduces the loss of resources which would 
have occurred with disruption of physical production. Both these effects will spur 
growth. The first does this by increasing the saving rate, the second by reducing actual 
resources lost by the premature liquidation of investments. 
 
Following Levine, Bencivenga et al. (1996) maintain that equity markets can increase 
the average productivity of capital and, in turn, positively affect growth by decreasing 
liquidity costs. The idea is that projects which require longer periods of time to 
complete are usually also investments with a higher expected return. These projects, 
however, will not be taken on by investors who do not want to tie up their financial 
resources for a long time. Therefore, assets with long maturities will never be 
demanded, unless these can be liquidated easily and at low cost. Again, equity markets 
make these projects attractive to investors by allowing the trading of all or part of 
project’s ownership at any time. The channels of interaction between stock markets and 
capital accumulation and growth are quite clear. As equity markets develop, longer 
maturity projects with higher rates of return become more attractive, the average 
productivity of capital increases, and so does the rate of growth. 
 
In a framework where agents face liquidity and productivity shocks, financial markets 
can help to reallocate resources towards the most productive investments by reducing 
idiosyncratic risks. Indeed, by considering an economy in which both banks and stock 
markets coexist, Greenwood and Smith (1997) show that financial markets, by 
decreasing liquidity risk, increase savings and pool resources towards larger, more 
productive projects. The average productivity of investment increases and so does the 
rate of growth. However, while equity markets always increase the growth rate relative 
to the case of autarky, equity markets increase the growth rate relative to banks only if 
agents are relatively risk averse. 
 
For Allen (1993) the emergence of equities primarily depends on the degree of 
complexity of the production structure, and on information gathering costs. One of the 
advantages of stock markets is that they allow for efficient risk sharing by providing 
incentives for investors to search for information. The basic idea is well known in the 
literature. Grossman (1976, 1978), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), and Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1982) build theoretical models in which stock markets efficiently cluster 
together very different investors’ information. Stock prices, therefore tend, in efficient   14
markets, to reflect the true valuation of underlying investment projects and constitute a 
clear signal for the actual rates of return on capital. As a consequence, stock prices are 
an efficient instrument for correct resource allocation. It is for this reason that they can 
boost economic development and growth. It is clear that where the production system is 
more complex, as Allen outlines, the process of information acquisition is more difficult 
and the working of equity markets in the process of capital accumulation will be more 
effective. Although, at first sight, this explanation appears to be fully satisfactory, two 
questions remain. What is the difference between equity markets and banks given that 
banks also help in providing information through monitoring and screening? And, why 
do stock markets appear only at an advanced stage of economic development, and only 
in some countries and not in others?  
 
The answers to these two questions are to be found in the processes of information 
transfer between firms’ management and the market, and in the possibility of 
identifying optimal investment strategies. In the presence of very simple productive 
systems, when optimal investment opportunities and management policies can be easily 
identified—for example, because these policies are limited in their number or because 
the feasible options do not change very rapidly over time—the banking system can 
gather enough information for optimal resource allocation. A typical example of a 
productive system in which simple production processes prevail is one dominated by the 
agriculture sector. Determination of optimal investment opportunities and control of 
management strategies are not difficult to carry out in such a framework. However, as 
the number of firms’ investment opportunities increases, and the production processes 
become more and more difficult to control (not only by external observers, but also by 
firms’ management), continuous monitoring becomes essential for the efficient 
allocation of resources. Stock markets, under such circumstances, become the best 
instrument for optimal investment control and risk diversification. Stock markets are 
more costly for the system overall than banks. However, they become more convenient 
when the production system becomes more complex. Banks and financial intermediaries 
in general do not allow for continuous monitoring. This explains why banks prevail in 
economies with simpler production structures, for example economies dominated by the 
agricultural sector, and stock markets become increasingly important as economies 
grow and display more articulated and complex productive systems.  
 
One final observation on the market structure is necessary. The hypothesis of complete 
and efficient markets throws up some theoretical puzzles over the existence of 
incentives for information production. As pointed out by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), 
if markets are complete and perfect, then prices will reflect all available information in 
the market. Therefore, given that collecting information is costly, nobody will have any 
incentive to collect information and monitor firms. This paradox is solved by Grossman 
and Stiglitz by assuming incomplete markets and by assuming variables which are 
unobservable to participants.  
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Another channel through which stock markets can positively affect growth is the 
continuous monitoring on firms’ management which greatly improves resource 
allocation. Indeed, continuous monitoring and control can provide the most effective 
incentives for mangers to choose investment projects which maximize firms’ market 
value and, therefore, increase the average return on capital and investment. The interests 
of firms’ management do not coincide with the interest of firms’ shareholders and 
owners and, as a consequence, managers’ decisions might be in contrast with firms’ 
interest and profitability. Such a potential conflict of interests generates a typical agency 
problem which can be solved by means of credible threats and incentive-compatible 
contracts. Incentives for managers to act in the best interests of firms come from two 
main sources: one is the threat of possible takeover, the other is the introduction of 
effective incentive-compatible payment schemes.  
 
Quotation in the stock market might potentially force managers to try to maximize the 
value of the firm, since publicly quoted firms which perform poorly may become the 
target of possible takeovers which, usually, entail the removal of the management. This 
threat can be sufficient for managers to act in the interest of the firm (Laffont and Tirole 
1988; Sharfestein 1988, Stein 1988). From a different perspective, but with similar 
effects, the continuous monitoring of firms’ performance following quotation on the 
stock market makes it possible to build optimal compensation schemes which can force 
managers to put in high levels of effort and take the best resource allocation decisions 
(Diamond and Verrecchia 1982; Jensen and Murphy 1990).  
 
Despite the success of the above arguments in clearly highlighting the benefits of the 
stock markets and providing a satisfactory description of the channels through which 
quotation on the stock market can affect investment decisions and the growth rate of the 
economy, some interesting questions remain unanswered. If the continuous monitoring 
from stock markets is so valuable, why don’t all firms decide that being publicly quoted 
is best? The answer to this question is essentially that monitoring is costly for firms 
(Holmstrom and Tirole 1993). As Holmstrom and Tirole argue, monitoring is valuable 
because it gives speculators information advantages which can be turned into profits. 
The higher the value of the information, the higher the value of monitoring will be. 
However, information advantages are strictly linked to the share price. Only if the actual 
share price is far from the fair value, and someone knows it, is there the possibility of 
profit. Information and monitoring costs result in a lower share price and a loss for the 
owner.  
 
Finally, another channel through which stock markets may positively affect capital 
accumulation and economic growth is the improvement of risk diversification through 
international financially integrated markets. Indeed, as shown by Obstfeld (1994), an 
increase in the degree of international integration of stock markets reduces the level of 
average investment risk through diversification and leads to a shift in the global 
portfolio from safe low-yield projects to riskier high-yields projects. This shift induces   16
an increase in capital productivity and in the saving rates, both of which should boost 
growth. However, it is also necessary to recognize that portfolio diversification, 
depending on agents’ degree of risk aversion, can decrease the level of savings and 
negatively affect growth (Devereux and Smith 1994). 
3.2 Instrumental  approach 
The most recent literature on stock markets development and economic growth has 
shifted the focus from the role of markets and institutions to the nature of the underlying 
financial contracts. The objective of this literature is to explain the emergence and 
evolution of stock markets by analysing how capital accumulation affects firms’ optimal 
financing choice and, in turn, how firms’ corporate financing decisions affect 
investments and capital accumulation. Evidently, this kind of analysis needs to 
investigate in detail the main features of the optimal financial contracts available to 
firms: costs, benefits, and possible impacts on the production process. Although 
intuitively straightforward and apparently simple, this type of investigation faces 
theoretical obstacles. In a standard Arrow–Debreu framework, in which markets are 
perfect, agents are fully informed and there are no transaction costs, the Modigliani-
Miller theorem holds and the value of a firm is unaffected by how that firm is financed. 
In this framework, whether the firm issues equity or takes on debt in order to raise 
money is completely irrelevant to the firm’s investment decisions as well as to its 
market valuation. Under these conditions, a firm’s financial capital structure is 
completely irrelevant for real resource allocation. As a consequence, the frictionless 
Arrow–Debreu setup needs to be modified in order to develop a theory which can 
explain the connections between financial and real variables. Economists have modified 
this framework in different ways, for example by introducing different kinds of market 
frictions, such as liquidity costs and transaction costs, or by assuming imperfect 
information between borrowers and lenders. Thus, the arguments are that financial 
markets can affect growth through the reduction of liquidity risks, or because they can 
increase the flow of savings and channel such resources towards more productive 
alternatives (Greenwood and Jovanovich 1990; Levine 1991; Bencivenga and Smith 
1991; Saint-Paul 1992; Blackburn and Hung 1998; among others).
2 
 
Similar arguments have been put forward to explain the dynamic role of stock markets 
in the process of real resource allocation. However, only recent developments in the 
literature on optimal financial contracts under information asymmetry have provided 
significant insights for new avenues of investigation on the co-evolution of equity 
market development and economic growth. These recent studies on stock market 
development integrate microeconomic models of optimal financial contracts under 
information asymmetry into dynamic general equilibrium models.  
 
                                                 
2 Levine (1997) and Becsi and Wang (1997) provide a very broad review of this literature.   17
In the presence of information asymmetries between lenders (typically households) and 
borrowers (typically firms) different informational problems might arise and the 
exchange of resources can become costly, sometimes to such an extent as to prevent 
capital markets from functioning at all. For example, problems of adverse selection 
might arise when firms have the possibility of hiding their expected profits or their level 
of efficiency. Problems of moral hazard might arise because of the incentive for firms to 
misreport the actual return on their investments. These informational problems generate 
agency costs, and the financial contract is the result of agents’ attempts to reduce these 
costs. The financial contract, as well as the financial market, is, therefore, endogenously 
determined. The link between growth and finance arises because growth can affect the 
level of agency costs and hence financial arrangements, while the structure of the credit 
market affects growth because it determines the amount of resources invested and the 
allocation of capital.  
 
The optimal financial contract, depending on the nature of information asymmetries and 
on agents’ endowments, might display very different features. Typically, financial 
contracts take only two forms: one is equity, the other debt. The differences between the 
two are quite sharp. Equity entails a repayment which depends on firm’s profits (or 
losses) and, in specific terms, it entails a repayment which is directly proportional to 
firm’s investment returns. While debt involves a fixed, pre-determined repayment which 
does not depend on firm’s profits, up to the point that profit is enough to repay the 
lender what has been contractually promised. Therefore, while debt involves 
bankruptcy, equity does not. Despite these clear differences, the literature on corporate 
finance has found it difficult to justify the issue of equity even in a framework with 
information asymmetries. In fact, debt always dominates equity repayment. Intuitively, 
if the firm-borrower has private information of very high rates of return on the project in 
need of external finance, it is not going to choose a repayment which involves sharing 
proportionally the return on those projects with others (equity repayment). If debt is 
available, the firm is always going to choose this form of repayment even in the 
presence of very high bankruptcy costs. Indeed, the issue of equity very often involves 
sending negative signals to the market (Leland and Pyle 1977; Myers and Majluf 1984) 
and results in a negative appraisal of the firm. Equity is treated as a residual alternative 
and as a suboptimal choice compared with debt. 
 
The most recent studies have moved away towards a different approach which 
essentially hinges on a very simple consideration. Equity and debt involve very different 
financial costs and the issue of only equity, of only debt, or of a combination of the two, 
is simply the result of a firm’s optimal investment decision which is taken in order to 
minimize those financial costs. As can be easily understand, these studies on a firm’s 
optimal financial structure are strictly related to the literature on Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs). The decision to go public and to issue shares is a complex one and it depends on 
institutional factors as well as on the economic environment. In practice the decision to 
enter the stock market involves the comparison of a wide array of costs and benefits.   18
Pagano et al. (1998) provide detailed empirical analysis of the major determinants of 
IPOs. Using a large database of Italian firms, they find that ultimately three major 
factors determine the decision of a firm to go public: (a) the stock market valuation of 
other firms in the same industry; (b) the company’s size; and (c) the destination of the 
raised funds, that is, how firms employ these resources.  
 
Very simple and intuitive reasons lie behind these results. The higher the valuation of 
firms in a given sector, the more probable it is that a firm operating in the same sector 
will go public. This finding confirms the arguments of Pagano (1993) that the issue of 
new equity is essentially a matter of strategic complementarities in the market, and the 
optimal solution to problems of information asymmetries. The probability of going 
public is also positively affected by a company’s size. The larger the firm, the more 
convenient quotation on the stock market will be. This evidence seems to confirm the 
existence of fixed costs of listing and of economies of scale. Finally, the results of this 
study suggest that firms do not usually issue equity to finance expansionary investments 
but rather to repay outstanding debt or to reduce negative financial positions. 
Interestingly, Pagano et al. (1998) also find support for the existence of a kind of 
complementarity between equity and debt. Indeed, they find that going public enables 
companies to borrow more cheaply: equity reduces the cost of debt. Although Pagano et 
al. do not explicitly consider the impact of IPOs on capital accumulation, their results 
provide very interesting insights into the issue.  
 
Recent studies explain the emergence of equity markets by analysing the optimal 
financial contract under information asymmetry and by investigating the changes 
involved because of capital accumulation. Information asymmetries can strongly modify 
agents’ incentives and, therefore, contractual agreements between borrowers and 
lenders. A typical incentive problem, for example, arises when lenders are unable to 
observe directly the outcomes of the projects to be financed and, therefore, face moral 
hazard problems. The implication of such problems is that lenders must monitor, or 
verify, the claims of borrowers about projects’ returns. However, since verification is 
costly, lenders find it optimal to verify only in a limited set of possible contingent states. 
Typically, the optimal solution to a standard costly state verification (CSV) problem, 
under the assumption that agents are risk neutral and monitoring costs do not depend on 
project returns, is always a debt contract. In other words, the loan repayment is 
predetermined and independent of the actual outcome of the investment (Townsend 
1979; Diamond 1984; Gale and Hellwig 1985; Williamson 1986, 1987a, 1987b). The 
reason being that debt, which involves a fixed repayment, does not require costly 
monitoring providing that the contractual repayment is honoured. This would not be 
feasible if the loan repayment were a function of the project’s return, like for example 
equity, and monitoring would be required in all states.  
 
Boyd and Smith (1996, 1998) modify the standard CSV framework in order to provide 
an account of why equity might dominate debt at least in some circumstances. In Boyd   19
and Smith, borrowers have access to two alternative projects for producing capital. The 
first project has a higher expected return which is known to the lender. The actual return 
on the project, however, is unobservable to outsiders. If the lender wants to verify the 
result of production, they must incur a cost which is decreasing in the price of capital 
(the interest rate). The second project has a lower expected return, but the actual return 
on this project is costlessly observable to lender. Interestingly, Boyd and Smith show 
that the way the lender optimally finances the two projects are different. In specific 
terms, while the unobservable project is optimally financed through a debt contract, the 
observable project is optimally financed through equity issue. The dependence of the 
equity-debt choice on growth is easily explained. For a low level of capital 
accumulation, when the interest rate is high, monitoring costs are relatively low. As a 
consequence, agents tend to use the unobservable technology. This, in turn, implies that 
debt finance is more widespread than equity finance. As capital accumulates, and the 
price of capital decreases, monitoring costs increase, and the unobservable technology 
becomes less and less profitable. As a result, equity finance will make up a larger share 
of the economy. This process explains the emergence of stock markets at later stages of 
economic development. 
 
Although the positive correlation between stock market development and economic 
growth has been established empirically, the causal relationship between these variables 
is still an obscure point. Is it stock market development that spurs economic growth, or 
is it capital accumulation that drives the emergence and the development of equity 
markets? Blackburn et al. (2005) provide an account of the possible two-way linkages 
between stock market development and economic growth, and an alternative 
interpretation of the development of equity markets. To these authors, the emergence of 
equity contracts is the result of lenders’ attempts to solve multiple enforcement 
problems when a firm’s choice of investment project and level of effort devoted to that 
project are private information. Capital accumulation can influence the development of 
equity markets because it can affect the degree of control that the lender has over these 
choices. The analysis is based on a principal-agent framework in which the borrower-
firm (the agent) has access to an array of different projects, each with an expected return 
that depends on the risk of the project itself and on the amount of effort that the 
borrower exerts. The lender (principal), who has the task of designing the optimal 
financial contract, cannot directly control the firm’s effort, but has the option to either 
impose their own choice of project at a cost, or to leave this choice up to the borrower. 
The optimal financial contracts under these two alternative scenarios are not the same. 
When the lender chooses the project, the optimal financial contract is typically a debt 
contract. When the firm chooses the project, the optimal financial contract is a mixture 
of debt and equity. The reason for this is that when the choice of project is imposed by 
the lender, a fixed repayment (debt contract) is sufficient to induce the optimal level of 
effort by the firm. By contrast, when the choice of project is left up to the borrower, a 
fixed repayment is not enough to induce the best level of effort, nor the best choice of   20
project; in this case part of the payment must be a function of the actual return (equity 
payment) in order to induce the borrower to exert the optimal effort.  
 
The optimal choice of contract depends essentially on the cost to the lender of taking 
charge of project selection. In Blackburn et al. (2005) this cost is represented by the 
wage that the lender is forgoing by not supplying their labour in the market, and by 
instead spending their time selecting and imposing the project choice on the borrower. 
At low levels of capital accumulation, when the return to labour is relatively low, and 
the wage rate is also low, this cost is low and the debt contract dominates. As the 
economy develops, and the wage rate prevailing in the market goes up, the cost of 
imposing the project choice increases until it eventually becomes optimal for the lender 
not to interfere directly in this choice; then the financial contract will involve both debt 
and equity. When equity markets appear, the economy jumps from a low capital 
accumulation path to a high capital accumulation path so that growth is temporarily 
stimulated. The reason being that fewer resources are wasted in the economy for project 
selection. This could explain the positive impact of stock market development on 
growth. 
 
The role of information asymmetries in financial contract design is extremely important 
not only in qualitative but also in quantitative terms. Recently, Bolton and Frexias 
(2000) have argued that when firms have superior information about the returns on their 
investments, the costs associated with the optimal security used to finance those 
investments depend on the degree of informational asymmetry. This is simply because 
lenders, who cannot a priori observe project returns, take an average of all possible 
outcomes. As in a typical lemon market, owners of projects with high returns will be 
penalized since their projects will be valued at a lower average price. This is referred to 
as the dilution cost of asymmetric information. Under such circumstances, Bolton and 
Frexias (2000) show that firms' optimal capital structure consists of two main forms of 
securities: equity and/or debt. The type of security issued depends on the level of 
dilution costs, together with the level of bankruptcy costs associated with the loss of 
future income following the borrower’s inability to repay debt.  
 
In a dynamic context, the level of information asymmetry does not stay fixed, but 
changes over time. It is commonly argued, for example, that in many countries the level 
of information available in the market increases considerably with the introduction of 
new communication technologies and the diffusion of many sources of information. It is 
therefore possible, in the wake of Bolton and Frexias’ arguments, to imagine that 
economic growth and capital accumulation, by bringing about an improvement in the 
level of information diffusion, engender a modification in financial securities’ costs and 
spur the development of equity financing. Following this line of argument, the 
emergence and growth of stock markets can be seen as the result of a reduction in the 
severity of information problems.  
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This idea can be modelled in a simple way (see Capasso 2004). Assume that different 
types of firms have access to different sets of projects with different expected returns. 
Assume also that the return on all, or some, of these projects depends on specific market 
conditions. The market value of a project reflects the level of information available in 
the market. Under the assumption that the same project yields different returns to 
different firms (for example, because some firms are more efficient than others), the 
value attached by the market to a project will depend on which type of firms find it 
optimal to carry out that project. If a project is run only by high productivity firms, then 
the market value will be high. On the other hand, if the project is run by less efficient 
firms, then its value will be lower, or ‘diluted’. This dilution cost is one of the factors 
which can determine the optimal choice of one form of security over another. If lenders 
know which firms prefer to operate which project, then the set of projects undertaken 
will signal precisely the nature and the type of firms in the market. If, on the other hand, 
some firms have access to common projects, then the type of firms in the market can be 
inferred only probabilistically by observing the projects. The higher the number of firms 
accessing the same sets of projects, the lower the probability of correctly inferring a 
firms’ type will be. Now, if the set of ‘common projects’ undertaken becomes smaller 
for some reason (for example, because some of these projects become economically 
inefficient), then the signal from the market becomes stronger and the possibility of 
inferring a firm’s type becomes higher. The link with growth arises from the fact that 
capital accumulation reduces the incentive of some low productivity firms to operate 
projects that are typical of more efficient firms. Thus, capital accumulation leads to an 
improvement in the ‘visibility’ of more efficient firms, it decreases the cost of equity 
issue, and it causes an expansion of stock markets. 
4 Conclusions 
The positive correlation between stock market development and economic growth is a 
well known empirical fact. Stock markets appear to emerge and develop only when 
economies reach a reasonable size, and the level of capital accumulation is high. 
Notwithstanding such uncontroversial empirical evidence, the causal relationship 
remains a debated issue in the literature. Is it stock markets that boost growth, for 
example by reducing liquidity and monitoring costs, or is it capital accumulation that 
induces a modification in the financial system which causes the emergence of equity 
financing, for example by engendering modifications in the optimal financial contract? 
In recent years, a growing body of theoretical literature has attempted to provide 
satisfactory answers to this question. These efforts have given rise to distinct 
methodological approaches which have highlighted both the macroeconomic and 
institutional aspects of the phenomenon, and its microeconomic roots.  
 
On the one hand, this large body of investigation has disclosed many interesting features 
of financial market development and provided new insights on the effects of financial 
variables on economic growth, on the other hand, it has raised further questions opening   22
new avenues for further research. In particular, the recent work, by focusing on 
individual firms’ optimal financing choice and on the optimal financial contract, have 
transferred issues of corporate finance from a purely microeconomic level of discussion 
to a macroeconomic one and have raised innovative and exciting questions which 
deserve to be dealt with. One of these is the role played by information dynamics and 
information technology diffusion on firms’ financing choice and, in turn, on financial 
market development and economic growth. 
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